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Improving service delivery and spearheading socio-economic development 
in Africa is not a technocratic matter nor is it primarily dependent upon the 
availability of resources. Strengthening state-citizen relations appears to be crucial 
to unlocking Africa’s untapped development potential. Government institutions 
that regularly communicate and cooperate with (institutions representing) 
ordinary citizens and are effectively held accountable achieve better results in 
sectors such as water management, agriculture and education.
“Government institutions that are effectively held accountable provide better 
services.”
As recent events to the north of the Sahara have shown, engaging citizens in 
governance processes and establishing institutions that are accountable to 
ordinary people are essential building blocks for sustainable development. Thus 
although the international development community has primarily perceived 
accountability as a tool to increase the effectiveness of aid (Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness [2005] and the Accra Agenda for Action [2008]), its potential 
goes well beyond aid-related issues. 
 
This brochure presents policy orientations for improving the service-delivery 
performance of local governments by integrating accountability mechanisms in 
existing (sector) support programmes. It primarily draws on a cross-country 
inventory study conducted by the Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG) 
International in partnership with the African Studies Centre (ASC). It also takes 
into account lessons emerging from seven accountability pilots championed 
by the SNV/Netherlands Development Organisation in partnership with the 
Embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) and VNG International. 
Recent publications by international think tanks and policy institutions have also 
been consulted (see reading list pag. 12).   
    
Introduction
 Building Blocks & Pillars of Accountability
Accountability 
Local accountability refers to the capacity of ordinary citizens to demand 
explanations and justifi cations from their local government and service 
delivery institutions (‘answerability’) as well as the possibility to sanction local 
offi cials once they underperform (‘controllability’). Accountability relations 
lie thus at the very heart of state – citizen relations. The quality, availability 
and accessibility of information as well as genuine participatory mechanisms 
are considered two important building blocks upon which these two pillars 
of accountability stand.  Accountability is also shaped within a particular legal 
and political context. 
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There is an increasing body of empirical research illustrating that accountability 
mechanisms have great potential to contribute to more effective service 
delivery by local governments. These mechanisms gradually develop over time 
(‘accountability cycle’) and cut across multiple governance levels (‘accountability 
web’).
The Accountability Cycle 
Firstly, as state-society relations are often weak or even absent at the local 
level, particularly in rural areas, accountability mechanisms that stimulate 
service-delivery performance are only developing gradually. Establishing regular 
communication and cooperation networks between state and non-state actors 
provides the building blocks for accountability relations to emerge over time. 
Improving local service delivery by strengthening accountability therefore tends 
to follow a gradual, though not linear, process characterized by phasing and 
sequencing different interventions. The ‘accountability cycle’ is a useful tool for 
policy makers in this respect.
 
Before African citizens demand and obtain explanations and justifi cations from their 
local governments (‘answerability’) or threaten to sanction them (‘controllability’), 
thereby spearheading local service delivery, functioning communication and 
cooperation mechanisms are indispensable. 
Effective local communication mechanisms
Empirical studies convincingly demonstrate that formal information channels 
used by local governments mostly fail to raise transparency over key local 
governance documents (budget; subcontracts signed with service delivery 
institutions; tendering procedures) and to inform local citizens adequately. 
This is partly caused by generic challenges (language; infrastructure; 
illiteracy rates; geographical scattering). The case studies also illustrate that 
information particularly fuels local accountability when used as input in 
regular platforms that bring together local governments, service delivery 
institutions and citizen’ representatives. 
Effective local cooperation mechanisms
Formal local participatory channels often lead to rituals of participation 
rather than meaningful participation by key stakeholders and ordinary 
citizens in local governance. Local governments generally control the 
participatory spaces by determining the agenda, invitation list and fi nal 
decision making process. Effective participatory mechanisms encountered 
in practice with a positive spin-off on service delivery, were those whereby 
the local government took much more of a coordinating role and set-up 
regular (inclusive) platforms of dialogue. Participation of rather ‘unusual 
suspects’ such as traditional and religious leaders as well as political 
party representatives and councillors in these platforms proved of great 
signifi cance. 
Two additional perspectives on local service delivery and accountability
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From participation to cooperation: Illustrating its potential for service delivery (Benin, Ghana and Zambia)
Local government in Ouinhi (Benin) receives funding from the state on an 
annual basis to fi nance its interventions in the primary-education sector. The 
municipal council always used to decide what to buy or do with the money 
without consulting teachers’ associations, local school directors or other local 
authorities. Teachers were frequently dissatisfi ed with the choices made as they 
believed the priorities lay elsewhere. A newly elected mayor decided to set up 
a dialogue platform with all the relevant stakeholders in the education sector. 
In close cooperation with the teachers, the school management and parents’ 
association, a joint decision was taken on how to allocate the funds received 
from central government. All the teachers interviewed indicated that they were 
extremely satisfi ed with this new approach and local opinion leaders claimed 
that this method was much more effective and that social services in the local 
education sector had improved. 
Local government in Kaoma District (Zambia) initially operated in isolation 
within the education sector too. Frustrated by poor levels of service delivery, 
parents started to improve sanitation, security and water supplies in the schools 
by themselves and, in the process, became more knowledgeable about the 
challenges facing the local education sector and established important civic 
networks. Gradually, networks of cooperation between parents, teachers and 
local government developed, giving a different character to the state-citizen 
relationship. Instead of parents merely complaining without any knowledge or 
involvement in education delivery, they became engaged in a constructive dialogue 
with government institutions. Local government realized that a relationship of 
accountability was based on mutual support to effectively and effi ciently provide 
service delivery and it has become much more willing to cooperate. Clearer roles 
and responsibilities between citizens and government are starting to take shape 
at school and district level and are stimulating networks of cooperation that are 
improving local service delivery. (Example drawn from SNV Working Paper on 
local accountability). 
The VNG inventory study conducted in Tamale (Ghana) also demonstrated how 
networks of cooperation between local government and different (formal and 
informal) stakeholders impacted positively on local service delivery. Together 
with the butchers’ association, the local government co-managed a cattle ranch. 
Sanitation was improved in close cooperation with civic communities that 
contributed fi nancially. Numerous focus-group participants expressed high levels 
of satisfaction about cooperation with local government in these areas and 
highlighted positive developmental results. 
Cooperation between state and non-state actors fostering accountability and improved 
services in rural Mali
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The Accountability Web
A second common feature of effective accountability mechanisms that stimulate 
local service delivery is illustrated by the ‘accountability web’. Local governments 
maintain relations with various formal and informal institutions and actors operating 
at different governance levels. The strength and incentives local government face 
from these different actors greatly infl uence their service-delivery performance.
Understanding these relations in which local governments are embedded is of 
crucial importance for providing effective support to local service delivery. Many 
case studies, for example, illustrate that too often donor support is limited to the 
local level while effective local service delivery depends on support strategies at 
the interface of the local and national level. Similarly, support is often focussed on 
formal state or non-state institutions, while informal actors (the unusual suspects) 
play a very infl uential role too. 
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An empirical knowledge base on accountability is gradually developing and 
increasingly enables an understanding of its functioning in different contexts. 
Despite the variety of experiences, a number of generic policy orientations 
can be formulated. Successful support of local service delivery by integrating 
accountability mechanisms involves:
• anchoring accountability interventions in sector policies
• moving beyond the local level and intervening at the interface of governance 
   levels
•  moving beyond the state-civil society dichotomy and strengthening interaction 
• timing accountability interventions in relation to political and policy processes 
• understanding and infl uencing popular perceptions of accountability
Anchoring accountability interventions within sector policies
Accountability is still often perceived as a relatively separate aspect of 
development programmes. This is not surprising considering its relatively recent 
arrival on the international development agenda. Many donors are still struggling 
to integrate the accountability concept in their regular development programmes 
and often develop accountability support programmes parallel to budget- and 
sector-support programmes. Empirical cases however clearly indicate that an 
integration of accountability mechanisms in sector policies has a positive impact 
on service-delivery performance. The example from Benin (see pag. 9) reveals 
how enhanced local accountability relations signifi cantly improved people’s access 
to water and the management of local water installations. 
“Integrating accountability mechanisms into sector policies has a positive 
impact on service-delivery performances.”
Intervening at (the interface of) multiple governance levels
Accountability lies at the heart of state-citizen relations and is thus, by nature, 
highly political and infl uenced by society’s broader political and institutional set-
up. Improving the service-delivery performance of local governments through 
enhanced accountability mechanisms therefore also requires interventions that 
move beyond the local level. 
The overall legal framework and political context merit particular attention here. 
Local governments in most Sub-Saharan African countries are facing political 
and institutional incentives to be ‘upwardly’ accountable, are fi nancially highly 
dependent on central government and have virtually no discretionary authority 
to spend resources according to local priorities. A combination of executive 
dominance and political clientelism further increases the dependence of local 
government on the central government. In addition, the formal division of tasks 
between representatives of the central state, decentralized agencies and locally 
elected bodies is often unclear or even contradictory, thereby frustrating both 
accountability and service-delivery performances at the local level.
Supporting legal and political reform processes (including the quality of the 
decentralization process) at the national level generates an enabling environment 
for enhanced accountability and improved service delivery at local level. The 
accountability web is a useful tool for mapping and analyzing the broader context 
in which local government operates. 
“Improving local service-delivery performances in an effective way requires 
support for broader institutional and political reform processes at the national 
level.”
Supporting local service delivery by integrating accountability mechanisms
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Two key features of Ghana’s institutional anatomy particularly infl uence the 
ability of local governments to perform their service-delivery and accountability 
roles. The fi rst relates to the appointment of District Chief Executives (DCE) 
and the second to the timing of local elections. 
According to the 1992 Constitution, the District Assembly (DA) is the highest 
political authority at the local level. Two-thirds of its members are elected by 
the people and the other third are appointed by the national President. DA 
members elect a Presiding Member from their midst to chair DA meetings and 
activities are largely conducted through committees. The executive committee 
is the most powerful and is responsible for general policy and development 
planning at the local level and for the main executive and administrative 
functions. To maintain a strict division of powers, the constitution excludes the 
Presiding Member of the DA and district MPs from the executive committee. 
The chair of the executive committee is the DCE, who is appointed by the 
national President. The result of this system is that an appointed representative 
of the central government chairs the most powerful body at the district level, 
from which the Assembly’s own elected leader is excluded. 
Local elections for the 110 district assemblies are held every four years, halfway 
though the national electoral cycle. When taking power, a new President (in 
the case of an alternation) nominates new DCEs affi liated to his own political 
party. The effect of this system in Bongo District over the last two years has 
been stifl ing. Between 2008 and 2010, the DA was made up of 27 NPP and 9 
NDC members, which refl ected the political colour of the former presidency. 
During this period, the DCE was from the NDC, the party that took over the 
presidency following the December 2008 elections. When the DCE proposed 
buying a grader and a tipper truck to improve the local roads (and thus access 
to markets for farmers), the NPP majority on the district assembly voted 
against it because it would have been perceived as an NDC initiative. This led 
to an impasse and no developmental decisions could be taken until after the 
next elections. 
The Bongo case clearly demonstrates that local government performance is 
much more infl uenced by informal political networks than formal (electoral) 
accountability arrangements. Until the legal framework is changed to 
harmonize the local and national electoral cycles and/or alter the appointment 
structure of the DCE, the political impasse will prevail in the period between 
national and local elections in the case of a power alternation at national level. 
Legal and political reforms at the national level are thus required to stimulate 
local accountability and service delivery. (See the VNG Ghana Inventory research 
carried out by Sebastiaan Soeters.)
Strengthening interaction between state and non-state actors 
Traditionally, international development policies have either focussed on 
strengthening civil society (‘voice’: the demand side of accountability) or on 
building the capacity of local governments (‘responsiveness’: the supply side of 
accountability). Empirical case studies suggest, however, that effective accountability 
mechanisms that spearhead service delivery largely result from interventions that 
foster connections and co-operation between local state and non-state actors.
Local government and interest groups discuss cooperation modalities in service 
delivery programme, Tanzania
Accountability at the interface of multiple governance levels (Ghana)
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The accountability cycle and service delivery in the local water sector (Benin) 
Access to drinking water in Benin’s rural areas increased from 35% in 2002 to 
55.3% in 2009 and is likely to reach the 70% threshold by 2015. This progress 
partly stems from strategic policies developed at the national level and fi nancial 
commitments made by donors and central government (accountability web). 
At the local level, interventions in the accountability cycle have contributed to 
improved service-delivery performances. 
In Ouinhi, for example, an external expert fi rst examined the state of affairs 
at all local water installations. His report highlighted the specifi c defi ciencies of 
each water point and was distributed to various local actors, notably the water 
monitoring committees at village level. The results were also presented on two 
local radio stations and citizens could phone in to ask questions. Subsequently, an 
NGO facilitated a number of meetings between local government offi cials, local 
A new water installation in Northern Benin funded by The Netherlands
Accountability cycle & the local water sector (Benin)
water-management institutions, traditional village leaders and other stakeholders 
to discuss and plan repairs. An infl uential local opinion leader indicated that 
local government offi cials now regularly visit the water points to see whether 
improvements are being made and it is now easier to keep track of the changes. 
Various respondents confi rmed that offi cials in the water sector are conducting 
more fi eld visits than before and are addressing problems more rapidly. The 
assessment report and dialogue platforms have thus provided a useful monitoring 
tool and stimulated the performance of local government offi cials in the water 
sector. Communication and cooperation mechanisms have spearheaded 
answerability relations between local government offi cials and ordinary citizens, 
which has impacted positively on local services. Local citizens have also held 
demonstrations and threatened to vote for other politicians if certain measures 
are not addressed by local government. 
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Supporting local accountability thus requires focusing on state-society connections 
rather than on providing support for either civil society or local governments in an 
isolated manner. By setting up or strengthening communication and cooperation 
channels between local governments and (formal and informal) non-state actors, 
the conditions under which accountability and improved service delivery can take 
root are improved (see example from Uganda).
Timing accountability in relation to broader political and 
policy processes
The effectiveness of accountability and its impact on service delivery benefi t from 
the close alignment of different phases of electoral, policy-planning and budgetary 
cycles. Strategically timing accountability interventions have a considerable impact 
on service-delivery performance. 
Releasing information on the poor quality of services provided by local 
government during an election campaign, for example, can generate a more rapid 
response than doing so halfway through an electoral cycle. The period after an 
election often proves to be more conducive to fostering a multi-actor dialogue 
on political and institutional reforms or preparing input in budgetary and planning 
processes. 
“Effective local accountability support requires the mapping of the different 
time phases of relevant processes, such as the electoral cycle and budgetary 
process, and the identifi cation of windows of opportunity.” 
Illustrating state-society answerability mechanisms that stimulate local service delivery (Uganda)
In Uganda, the Community Development and Child Welfare Initiatives (CODI), a 
local community based organisation based in Luwero, is facilitating a social audit 
project, which brings together political leaders, technical staff, opinion leaders and 
citizens to interface with each other and hold local leaders answerable through 
public dialogues. 
In each of the four sub-counties in Luwero, community meetings, usually attended 
by over 1000 local people, are organized on a quarterly basis and district and sub-
county political leaders are invited to discuss the progress of government projects 
and plans. Community members are able to hold their leaders to account through 
direct questions and the sharing of experiences, which may or may not be in line 
with what the political leaders report. At the end of every session, community 
members agree on issues to be raised and discussed at the next meeting, thus 
setting the agenda themselves. The CODI ensures that the relevant technical and 
political leaders are present at the subsequent social audit meeting to answer to 
the queries raised by community members. The issues raised at the meetings in a 
given sub-county are put forward to the sub-county council meetings for redress. 
The CODI works to bring issues beyond their mandate to the attention of LCV 
council meetings through the district speaker and the clerk to the council.
Though initially perceived by the local leadership as a witch-hunt, these community 
platforms are increasingly gaining prominence and support. They function as 
informal information-sharing and dialogue platforms and enable local actors to 
demand justifi cation from their local government. The Bamunanika sub-country 
case in particular demonstrates the (potential) impact of these forums on 
answerability mechanisms. In the Bamunanika case, the LC III treasurer was forced 
to resign after his failure to explain the alleged mismanagement of resources during 
the construction of the main village road. (See the VNG Uganda Inventory research 
carried out by Lillian Tamale and Karijn de Jong.)
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Popular perceptions and demand for accountability 
Surveys have indicated that traditional and religious leaders play a crucial role 
in local governance processes. Working to involve these actors in participatory 
processes is likely to make accountability for service-delivery performance more 
effective. However, faith-based organizations and local elders are not often 
involved in support programmes funded by external donors, who tend to focus 
much more on formal NGOs.
Popular perceptions in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to respect rather than question 
leaders. According to Afrobarometer surveys, a majority of particularly rural 
citizens hold a ‘parental’ view of governance whereby local leaders are expected 
to take care of their constituents like a father fi gure. In the absence of a popular 
basis critically scrutinising local leaders, accountability incentives stimulating overall 
service delivery risk to remain weak.
Opinion surveys also show that local government responsiveness is closely linked 
to corruption. Bribing local government offi cials has become a successful strategy 
for securing personal assistance. But empirical examples also illustrate how taxation 
instead of corruption (particularly in urban areas) has provided the fi nancial incentives 
to hold local government accountable for its service-delivery performance. 
Billboard highlighting the link between taxes and public services, Benin
Supporting local accountability thus not only requires building on (informal) 
local institutions that are considered effective by local citizens but also entails 
transforming the perverse link between corruption and local government 
responsiveness in taxation and representation. A more substantive popular basis 
that demands improved service delivery at the local level is required. 
Conclusion
Ameliorating service delivery performances of local governments in Sub 
Saharan Africa is much more than a fi nancial or technical matter. It is highly 
political and particularly requires constructive state – citizen relations. 
This brochure has shown the potential of accountability mechanisms to 
contribute to improved service delivery performances and highlighted 
common features of effective accountability mechanisms. 
Anti-corruption paintings in Kampala, Uganda
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